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Over the past few years, litigation
between students and the universities
they attend has become a matter of
course. Students have turned to the
courts to protect their rights and to
check administrative discretion. For
better or for worse, universities are
made more accountable to the rule of
law.
Yet, despite this alleged injection of
legal norms into university life, courts
have almost uniformly upheld academic
and disciplinary dismissals of students.
Underlying these decisions is a judicial
presumption that the relationship
between student and university is
unique:
Transcending that bare relationship is the understanding that the
student will abide by the reasonable regulations both academic
and disciplinary, that the student
will meet the academic standards
established by the faculty, and
that the university on the successful completion of studies will
award the degree sought to the
student. (Napolitano v. Princeton
University, 1982.)
The parameters of this quasi-associational, quasi-contractual relationship
are the subject matter of a lawsuit
involving Princeton University and
Gabrielle Napolitano, a student whose
diploma is being withheld for a year due
to a finding by a university committee of
a plagiarism violation.

Factual Background
Gabrielle Napolitano, an outstanding
student at Princeton, was accused of

plagiarising a term paper in a Spanish
literature course during her senior year.
The assignment was to write in Spanish
a critical analysis of one of the works
read for the course. Napolitano met
with the professor to seek approval of
her topic on the last day of classes
before the Christmas recess. At this
meeting, the professor suggested that
Napolitano refer to a particular secondary source, which was an interpretation of the work which Napolitano had
selected as the subject for her term
paper. The professor in that course
alleged that Napolitano knowingly
submitted a term paper which was
nothing more than a mosaic of excerpts
from this single secondary source. In
support of this allegation, the professor
pointed to thirty-seven places where
Napolitano used the exact language of
the secondary source without attribution. The professor also noted that
Napolitano had signed a pledge
attesting to the originality of her work.
Counterbalancing this allegation of
intentional deceit, Napolitano stressed
the fact that the professor recommended that she use the secondary
source in question. Because of this,
Napolitano felt that the professor
would anticipate her heavy reliance on
this source. Additionally, Napolitano
claimed that it would be extremely
unlikely that any student would
intentionally plagiarize from a source
with which the professor had already
demonstrated her familiarity. Finally,
Napolitano pointed to the fact that she
had expressly cited the source in
question on six occasions.
Napolitano was found guilty ofplag-

iarism by the university's Faculty-Student Committee on
Discipline. The committee voted to withhold N apolitano's diploma for one year. Napolitano unsuccessfully
appealed this decision to the president of the university.
Napolitano then instituted an action against the university. She claimed, among other things, that: (1) the Committee on Discipline was biased against her because she
was limited in her use of character witnesses and was not
permitted to cross-examine the professor; (2) the committee failed to follow its own procedures because it did
not make the requisite finding of "specific intent to pass
off the work of another's"; (3) she was improperly denied
the right to outside legal counsel at her hearing; and (4)
her punishment was unfair given both her excellent
record and the supposedly educative nature of disciplinary punishments.
The Napolitano case was first heard by the Mercer
County Chancery Court. That court initially ordered that
the university's Committee on Discipline rehear the case
to determine whether Napolitano intentionally sought to
deceive her professor. Upon rehearing, the Committee on
Discipline affirmed its earlier ruling and the university's
president denied Napolitano's appeal. The trial judge
upheld the finding of intentional plagiarism. The judge
also upheld the penalty imposed by the committee
although he personally felt it too severe, because "to
upset Princeton's decision I would have to find that
Princeton could not in good faith have assessed the
penalties .... "
Ms. Napolitano appealed this decision to the Appellate Divison of the Superior Court of New Jersey. That
court affirmed the trial court's decision on October 13,
1982. Ms. Napolitano decided not to appeal that decision
to the New Jersey Supreme Court.

Academic Evaluations vs. Disciplinary
Procedures: Varying Standards of Review
Courts, for the most part, are unwilling to intervene in
decisions by colleges and universities concerning grades,
academic evaluations, or academic dismissals of
students. On the other hand, courts will apply a stricter
standard of review over matters of discipline. Disciplinary dismissals or suspensions are those based on violation of the college's behavioral norms or rules of
conduct. The rationale behind this varying standard of
review was stated in Tedeschi v. Wagner College, 1980:

Matters involving academic standards generally
rest upon the subjective judgment of professional educators, courts are reluctant to impose
the strictures of traditional legal rules. Though
such matters are subject to judicial scrutiny, the
issue reviewed in such a case is whether the institution has acted in good faith.
Suspension or expulsion for causes unrelated to
academic achievement, however, involve determinations quite closely akin to the day-to-day
work of the judiciary. Recognizing the present
day importance of higher education to many, if
not most, employment opportunities, the courts

have, therefore, looked more closely at the
actions of educational institutions in such
matters.
The Tedeschi case is exemplary of the court's willingness to intervene in disciplinary matters. In Tedeschi, a
student was suspended for disciplinary reasons without
the benefit of a hearing as provided for in the college's
rules. New York's highest court ordered that Tedeschi be
reinstated, at least until she was dismissed according to
appropriate university procedures. The court indicated
that when a university has established a procedure, it
must substantially observe that procedure.
In stark contrast to Tedeschi, the New York Supreme
Court refused to intervene in an academic matter in
which a student was failed for a grade of 69. 7 when 70 was
the passing grade for the course. The court claimed:
This judicial reluctance to intervene encompasses controversies including academic standards. This policy ofjudicial restraint isfounded
upon sound considerations of public policy.
When an educational institution issues a
diploma to one of its students, it is, in effect,
certifying to society that the student possesses all
of the knowledge and skills that are required by
the chosen discipline. An educational institution
is not required to confer a diploma before the
student has demonstrated competence in
accordance with the institution's academic standarcls. (McIntosh v. Borough of Manhattan
Community College, 1980.)
In a similar vein, the First United States Circuit Court
of Appeals in Lyons v. Salve Regina College, (1977) let
stand a college dean's decision to disregard a recommendation-as being merely advisory in nature-by a grade
appeal committee and to deny Lyon's appeal of a failing
grade.

I
I

I

~Iij
I

I

Plagiarism: An Academic or a
Disciplinary Matter?
There is no conclusive authority on whether plagiarism
is an academic or a disciplinary matter. Plagiarism occurs
in an academic setting and, indeed, relates to the essence
of an academic degree. On the other hand, plagiarism has
aspects of a behavioral norm; in other words, students
shall not represent the works of another as their own.
Princeton University defines plagiarism as: "The deliberate use of any outside source without proper acknowledgement. Outside source means any work, published or
unpublished, by any person other than the student."
Princeton also requires its students' work to be original,
as evidenced by the pledge that must accompany all submissions. Apparently, professors at Princeton have great
discretion in determining whether a student submitted
nonoriginal work. This is borne out by the fact that a
Princeton professor, who testified on behalf of Ms.
Napolitano before the Committee on Discipline, argued
that he would not have viewed the Napolitano paper as
being plagiarized because she made reference to the
secondary source in question. At the same time, Prince-
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ton's student handbook thoroughly delineates general
requirements for the acknowledgment of academic work,
including quotations, paraphrasing, the use of ideas and
facts, and footnotes and bibliography. These careful
delineations suggest that the boundaries of permissible
and impermissible conduct ought to be fairly well known
to both students and professors.
Neither Princeton University nor Ms. Napolitano
argued that plagiarism ought to be viewed as an academic
offense. Yet the appellate court characterized it as such.
For that court characterized the problem as "one involving academic standards and not a case of violation of
rules of conduct." Consequently, that court held.that the
university's actions ought to be scrutinized under the
deferential academic decision-making standard.

The Analytical Framework: Contract
And Private Association Rationales
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Courts will generally limit their review of private
university academic and disciplinary decision-making to
a determination of whether a university abided by its own
regulations. The basis of this analytical framework is a
merger of the law of associations with the law of contracts.
There is little doubt as to the applicability of contract
doctrine to the university-student relationship:
The student comes to the academic community
(the university) seeking to be educated in agiven
discipline. The student pays a tuition which
might, in some instances, represent a contractual consideration. The university undertakes to
educate that student through its faculty and
through the association of other students with
that student and the faculty. (Napolitano, 1982)
But the courts are unwilling to apply rigidly the law of
contracts to the student-university relationship. In
Slaughter v. Brigham Young University, (1975) the Tenth
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, held the trial
court in error for its strict application of commercial
contract doctrine to the university's expUlsion of a
graduate student for academic dishonesty. Similarly,
Princeton stated in its brief before the appellate court:
Education contracts are unique and should not
be mechanistically construed, but should permit
the university to exercise sufficient discretion to
properly exercise its educational responsibility.
This uniqueness derives primarily from the similarities
between the relationship of a university to its student and
the relationship of a private association to its members.
This law, as recognized by the appellate court in
Napolitano quoting from another New Jersey case,
requires that:
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Courts ordinarily ought not to intrude upon
areas ofassociational decision involving specialized knowledge. . . . Private associations must
have considerable latitude in rule-making in

order to accomplish their objectives and their
private law generally is binding on those who
wish to remain members. (Higgins v. American
Society of Clinical Pathologists, 1968)
Consequently, courts generally will not intervene in
internal university decision-making. Instead, they will
merely require the university to abide by its own procedures. And if the matter at stake is an academic determination, the courts will even be deferential in their
review of whether the university abided by its procedures.

Legal Issues Raised in Napolitano
In challenging the university's action, Ms. Napolitano
raised a number oflegal issues. Where does the decisionmaking authority lie? Is a student at an independent
university entitled to be represented by counsel at university proceedings? Is the university's plagiarism
determination accurate? Is the punishment appropriate?
Ms. Napolitano alleged that the trial court-not the
University Committee on Discipline-should have determined whether she intentionally' sought to pass off the
work of another as her own. Ms. Napolitano asked the
court to alter its view of the allegedly special quasicontractual, quasi-associational relationship between a
university and its students and argued that courts ought
to recognize that "higher education at private universities is big business" and thus be willing to engage in
greater oversight of university affairs.
The appellate court rejected this argument. It held that
the student-university relationship is unique: "We must
give substantial deference to the importance of institutional integrity and independence." Consequently, the
appellate court held that decision-making authority in
this matter was appropriately lodged with the university'S
Committee on Discipline.
This conclusion was buttressed by court decisions,
such as Slaughter and Tedeschi, which recognized that a
court could do no more than require a university to abide
by its own procedures. In Slaughter, the court went so far
as to claim that:
School discipline problems must first be resolved in the school and by its constituted
authorities. This is a function of the educational
process and has always been considered a basic
element. The student places himselfin the school
community and traditionally those with immediate supervision plus one or more in an administrative position, or combined position, enforce
the rules of discipline. This has to be the starting
place at least.
Ms. Napolitano alleged that her hearing before the
university'S Committee on Discipline was necessarily
biased against her because she was not permitted to have
outside counsel represent her. In support of this position,
Napolitano pointed to Ryan v. Hofstra University,
(1971) a case in which New York's Supreme Court
ordered the reinstatement of a student expelled for dis-
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ciplinary reasons because Hofstra's policy only permitted
use of counsel employed by the university. In Ryan, the
court stated:
The university's interest in limiting counsel is
only administrative and not clear. ... The only
colorable administration interests in limiting
counsel can be the fear ofpublicity harmful to it
or the student, undue stress on legal technicality,
or overly extensive attack on it by a lawyer
unfeeling for the administration's problems.
These are not nearly justification to deny free
choice of counsel to a student literally fighting
for his academic life.

Countering Ryan, Princeton pointed to the fact that at an
independent institution a student was not entitled to
counsel for each academic or disciplinary dismissal.
Furthermore, it pointed out that in Gabrilowitz v.
Newman, (1978) the United States First Circuit Court of
Appeals held that even a state university student did not
have a right to counsel during a disciplinary procedure
unless there was related criminal charges pending against
the student. In Gabrilowitz. the court recognized that
"most courts have declined to grant students the right to
counsel in disciplinary proceedings," because "academic
institutions have a significant interest In tile promulgation of procedures for the resolution of student disciplinary problems."
The trial and appellate courts in Napolitano rejected
the ''right to counsel" allegation. For both courts, judicial
intervention on this matter was precluded because of the
university's authority to formulate its own substantive
rules of conduct and to specify the procedural rights of
students accused of violations of a rule. Independent
institutions have not been required to allow counsel
unless their own rules permit this type of representation.
The issue of whether plagiarism is an academic or a
disciplinary matter is significant in determining whether
a court should upset a plagiarism conviction. Ms.
Napolitano claimed that plagiarism is strictly a disciplinary matter and thus the courts were required to review
carefully her conviction. The appellate court, however,
applied a deferential standard of review by holding that
plagiarism is an academic judgment.
Ms. Napolitano alleged that her punishment was far
too severe considering her past record, the nature of the
alleged plagiarism, and the history of past treatment of
students with similar offenses and backgrounds. As was
the case with the plagiarism determination, the court
refused to intervene. The trialjudge, despite his personal
disagreement with the university's action, held that:

so, considering my understanding of the proper
role of the courts.
The appellate court affirmed this determination. On this
issue, the weight of precedent clearly speaks in favor of
judicial deference to university disciplinary discretion.

The Significance of N apoiitano
The most troubling aspects of the Napolitano case are
not easily amenable to satisfactory judicial resolution;
namely, what constitutes plagiarism and what sorts of
penalties should be imposed in plagiarism cases. Because
of this, the courts are likely to defer to the rule-making
authority of colleges and universities. College and university administrators ought to delineate clearly what is
plagiarism and what are the penalties so that students are
aware of the standards and college and university officials abide by them. Otherwise, students will properly sue
colleges and universities for breaching their own procedures.
-Neal Devins
-Kent M. Weeks
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